I consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation rule. Players discount the future by a common factor. The pair formed by an allocation rule and a transition probability matrix is called expected fair if for every link in the network both participants gain, marginally, and in discounted, expected terms, the same from it; and it is called a pairwise network formation procedure if the probability that a link is created (or eliminated) is positive if the discounted, expected gains to its two participants are positive too. The main result is the existence, for the discount factor small enough, of an expected fair and pairwise network formation procedure where the allocation rule is component balanced, meaning it distributes the total value of any maximal connected subnetwork among its participants. This existence result holds for all discount factors when the pairwise network formation procedure is restricted. I finally provide some comparison with previous models of farsighted network formation.
in the creation (or elimination) of such a connection. This probability should be zero when the corresponding total discounted, expected gains are negative. Finally, the allocation rule is called component efficient, or component balanced, if it distributes the total value of a maximal connected subnetwork among its participants.
The property of expected fairness is a forward-looking extension of the concept of fairness, introduced by Myerson (1977) in a static setting where the surplus from cooperation is given by a TU game. An allocation rule is said to be fair if for every direct connection in the network, both participants gain or loose the same amount from breaking this connection. 3 Fairness, as an equal-gains principle, is an attractive property in contexts where the allocation rule results from a sequence of bilateral bargains, each corresponding to a link in the network, and where the creation of a link depends on how the (perfectly transferable) gains from creating that link are distributed between the two participants. Equal-gains means in such a context that both players are equally skilled for bargaining or have equal entitlements. It could be that the latter is what makes equal-gains a very robust and consistent result in laboratory experiments where pairs of players share a given amount, even when subgame perfect Nash equilibrium predicts an unfair bilateral distribution of payoffs. 4 Nevertheless, in static settings, fairness implies that the allocation rule for a given network depends on subnetworks exclusively, ignoring the value that players could potentially obtain in alternative networks that are not necessarily subnetworks. 5 By imposing expected fairness I keep the principle of equal-gains, but this time with respect to the whole stream of payoffs. As far as players are a bit patient, alternative networks that are not necessarily subnetworks will have an impact on the way the value of the current network is allocated as far as they will be reached in the future with some positive probability. Everything makes sense if in turn the probability to reach a given network from the current one depends on the gains that are obtained by the players responsible for the transition. This is captured in the definition of pairwise network formation procedure, explained in detail just below.
The definition of a pairwise network formation procedure captures some best-response dynamics as in the seminal paper by Jackson and Watts (2002) . Pairs of players are called to play with a certain probability at each point in time. When called to play, players decide wether to create a link if they are not directly connected in the current network, or to severe it if they are, or to leave the network unchanged. Dutta et al (2005) , Page et al (2005) and Herings et al (2009) have also proposed dynamic processes of network formation where players are forward looking, extending therefore Jackson and Watts (2002) setting. The main differences of all these contributions on network formation with what I do here is that the stage-wise allocation rule is exogenously given and the authors focus on the problem of network formation. Furthermore, Dutta et al (2005) and Herings et al (2009) find out solution concepts reconciling efficiency and stability in networks. Here, I take the stage-wise allocation rule to depend on the dynamics of the network formation because it is assumed to be generated at the same time as the deletion or creation of links are agreed upon, and my main interest is the problem of allocating the value of each network.
Assuming that the allocation rule is component efficient or component balanced means that, even though players look at the whole stream of payoffs to take their decisions, they are constrained by the total amount of value that cooperation can generate by each component in the network at each point of time. 6 In my view, component efficiency is not merely a requirement aiming at preventing the members of a component to walk away with their value, as in Jackson (2005) criticism of the Myerson value. 7 I think it makes sense in a setting where the current network represents all possibilities of cooperation or contact among agents at each point in time. In particular, component balance states that there are no implicit or explicit transfers of value or payoff among components in a network. If we allow transfers among components in a network we are acknowledging the existence of a path or a connection that makes agreements among components possible, particularly an exchange of money against behavior or organization. 8 But then the network must contain a link or a path connecting the two components, because otherwise, the network is not capturing everything that can be done by the players in the given population. The setting would not be self-contained and there are possibilities left out of the table when representing the network but not when allocating the value. 9 The main result shows the existence of a transition probability matrix P and an allocation rule y such that the allocation rule is component efficient and the pair (y, P ) is an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure, if the discount factor for the future is low enough. Nevertheless, if we restrict ourselves to clustering processes, then the existence result holds for any discount factor. 10 Furthermore, if the value function is separable-additive 11 then for any 6 A component in a network is a group connected agents (together with their connections) such that they are internally connected among them, but disconnected from the rest of the agents.
7 p. 138, 2nd and 3rd paragraph. 8 For example, because externalities across components are allowed in this setting I am analyzing here, we could imagine a component willing to pay money to another component in exchange of a more profitable structure for the paying component, that has to be built by the receiving component. 9 Caulier, Mauleón and Vannetelbosch (2012) and Caulier, Mauleón Sempere-Morris and Vannetelbosch (2012) propose a new setting in which individuals can cooperate at two overlapping levels, in networks and in coalitions. The component balance condition would in their setting require the payoff to be distributed by components, where a component is defined by the closure of the two structures together, and not on the network alone. Their setting is therefore self-contained and there are no other possibilities left out of the table. Here, I am analysing situations where cooperation is represented by a network exclusively. As mentioned before, payoff determination and link creation go hand in hand in my analysis here. If there are is no connection between two components in the network (which is true, otherwise they would be part of a greater component connecting both), then there is no possibility of a transfer or an agreement in terms of money. Everything is, of course, depending dramatically on what we are representing in the form of a network or what we want the network to represent. 10 By clustering processes I mean that new links can only be built among players that were already indirectly connected in the network.
11 I will give a more formal definition when needed. Intuitively, it means that the value extracted by each component is equal to the sum of independent, constant values of each link and of each individual in the component. discount factor there exists an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure such that the (stage-wise) allocation rule coincides with the Myerson value and the dynamics given by the transition probability matrix converge in the long run to an efficient network with probability one.
Concerning the long run behavior of a pairwise network formation process, the process converges in general to one or several expected (forward-looking) pairwise stable networks and/or to one or several cycles of networks, similarly to Jackson and Watts (2002) . 12 Here, a network is called expected pairwise stable if (1) every pair of players who are not directly connected in the network expect to lose if they create their connection and (2) every pair of players who are directly connected in the network lose in discounted, expected terms if they eliminate their connection. In other words, there is no pair of players who wants to connect or disconnect given the actual network, assuming that players take the future into account. Jackson & Wolinsky (1996) have defined the concept of pairwise stability when players only care about payoffs in the next stage, i.e., they do not care about the future.
Currarini and Morelli (2000) and Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000) study simultaneously the process of network formation and the allocation of the value of a network, as I do here. In these articles, however, both the network formation and the allocation of the value are a result of a multilateral (non cooperative) bargaining procedure written as a one-shot game. Jackson and Watts (2002) To conclude this introduction I would like to stress that the purpose of this paper is not to provide a forward-looking justification for the Myerson value, as it might look like given the definition of expected fairness. The solution concept proposed here is flexible enough to obtain different payoff recommendations than the Myerson value, and to show it I provide an example with three players. In such an example, the same value function yields at least two different pairs as a solution, a pair being a payoff recommendation together with a transition probability matrix. In the first one, the long run dynamics are the same as in Jackson and Watts (2002) deterministic setting (fixing the Myerson value as an exogenously given allocation rule), converging to the unique pairwise stable, but inefficient network, with probability one. The stage-wise allocation rule is different from the Myerson value, except for a discount factor equal to zero, when players are myopic. In the second pair, the long run dynamics converge to one of the three efficient networks with probability one (and away from the myopic pairwise stable one), if the discount factor is high enough, and the stage-wise allocation rule tends to the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule, different from the stage-wise Myerson value, as the discount factor tends to one. 13 12 A closed cycle of networks is a group of networks such that, once the process has arrived at a network in the cycle, it stays there forever. 13 The component-wise egalitarian allocation rule distributes the value of a component evenly among its partic-This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setting and main definitions. Section 3 states the main result and the special cases where the result can be extended. Section 4 compares the dynamics induced by an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure with previous notions of pairwise stability, and includes some illustrating examples. Finally, Section 5 concludes. The proof of a small technical detail has been included in Appendix A, while Appendix B contains some figures corresponding to the illustrating examples.
Preliminaries

Players, Coalitions and Networks
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a finite set of players. A subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition. Let 2 N be the set of all possible coalitions in N . There are network relations among the players in N , formally represented by an undirected graph. Here, an undirected graph g is a set of unordered pairs ij, with i, j ∈ N , and i = j. In what follows, each element ij in a graph g will be referred to as a link.
Let g N be the complete graph on the set N . Let g ∪ij denote the graph resulting from adding the link ij to the existing graph g, and let g\ij denote the graph resulting from eliminating the link ij from the graph g. A coalition T ⊆ N is a connected component of N in g if: (1) for each pair of players in T , there exists a path, i. e., a set of consecutive links, in g which connects them, and (2) for each player i in T and each player j not in T , there is no path in g which connects them. Let N |g be the set of connected components of N in g. Note that N |g is a partition of N . Let G be the set of all possible graphs over N .
Values and Allocation Rules
Assume now that for every graph g and for every connected component S ∈ N |g, there is a value w (S, g) which can be perfectly distributed among the players in S. A function w, which to every graph g and every connected component S in N |g assigns a value w (S, g), is called a value function. Let W denote the set of all possible value functions w when the set of players is fixed equal to N .
An allocation rule y is a function that assigns to every value function w in W a payoff recommendation y i,g (w) for every player i ∈ N and every graph g ∈ G. From now on I will omit w in brackets in all notation that follows, as I will consider it fixed. Abusing notation a bit I will also denote the resulting payoff vector from an allocation rule y by y ∈ n×|G| , for the sake of simplicity. An allocation rule y is called component efficient (Myerson, 1977) if for every graph ipants.
g ∈ G and for every connected component S ∈ N |g i∈S y i,g = w (S, g) .
An allocation rule y is called fair (Myerson, 1977) if for every graph g ∈ G and every link ij ∈ g y i,g − y i,g\ij = y j,g − y j,g\ij .
Fairness requires that the two players involved in the same link lose or gain the same by dissolving it. Feldman (1996) , Jackson & Wolinsky (1996) , and Navarro (2007) generalize the following early result by Myerson (1977) about the existence and uniqueness of a component efficient and fair allocation rule.
Proposition 2.1 (Myerson, 1977) . Given any value function w there exists a unique allocation rule which is component efficient and fair.
For the sequel, this component efficient and fair allocation rule will be called the Myerson value 14 and denoted by m.
Dynamics and Network Formation
We consider an infinite number of stages. At each stage t there is a transition probability from the existing graph g t to another graph g t+1 in the next stage. These probabilities do not depend on the period of time t, so that the graph at each stage follows a stationary Markov chain of infinite length with transition probabilities given by the matrix
where P (g |g) is the probability to arrive at g conditional on g being the current graph.
I would like the transition probability matrix to represent the way the agents in N build the network over time. Accordingly, the only transitions happening with positive probability are the ones corresponding to the creation or deletion of at most one link at a time. Formally, we can define an operator * : G × L → G, where L = g N ∪ ∅, assigning to every graph g in G and every link l in L the graph g * l ∈ G as follows. If l = ∅ and l ∈ g, then g * l = g\l. If l = ∅ 14 The setting I use here is the one proposed by Navarro (2007) , and the reader is referred to Navarro (2007) for the precise formula of the Myerson value in this setting. I choose not to include it in here because it requires defining TU-games in partition function form and defining the extension of the Shapley value to those games proposed by Myerson and l / ∈ g, then g * l = g ∪ l. Finally, if l = ∅, then g * l = g. Hence, P (g |g) > 0, for any pair of graphs g, g in G, only if there exists a link l ∈ g N ∪ ∅ with g = g * l. In words, at each point in time t at most one link in the network is added or removed from the current network. We could interpret the dynamics underlying P as a process during which one pair of players is called to play at each point in time, where each possible pair of players is called to play with positive probability. Once called to play, the pair of players may decide to build a link in the network when they are not directly connected, or whether they sever their link if the latter is present in the current network. Let Π denote the set of all possible transition probability matrices from graphs in G to graphs in G and such that P (g |g) > 0, for any pair of graphs g and g in G, only if there exists a link l ∈ g N ∪ ∅ with g = g * l. Jackson and Watts (2002) call the pair of graphs g and g in G such that there exists a link l ∈ g N ∪ ∅ with g = g * l adjacent graphs.
Players receive stage payoffs according to a stage-wise, stationary allocation rule y and they discount the future by some common factor 0 < δ < 1. Define
where the element P δ,∞ (g |g) can be interpreted as the total discounted probability of arriving at the end of the process at graph g when starting from graph g. For any allocation rule y, and any initial graph g, the discounted, expected payoff to player i is given by
As is well known, 15 the matrix (I − δP ) has an inverse, namely (I − δP ) −1 = P δ,∞ . Here, I is the identity matrix. Let x (y, δ, P ) = [x i,g (y, δ, P )] {i∈N, g∈G} . From now on, I will simply write x (y, P ) instead of x (y, δ, P ), for δ will be fixed.
Definition 2.2 A pair (y, P ), where y is an allocation rule and P is a transition probability matrix, is called expected fair if for every g ∈ G and every link ij ∈ g
By expected fairness it is required that, for each link in the network, both players lose or gain the same total amount in discounted, expected terms from eliminating their direct connection today. It is therefore an extension of the fairness property introduced by Myerson (1977) to situations where the network is evolving over time. In this extension players care about the total amount of payoff received in discounted, expected terms, and they are able to anticipate the evolution of the network over time.
Definition 2.3 Let the pair (y, P ) be expected fair. Then, (y, P ) is called a pairwise network formation procedure if for any given g and g ∈ G such that g = g * ij:
When we consider the pair ij, the definition of pairwise network formation does not depend on taking player i or player j's payoffs as a reference, because the pair (y, P ) is expected fair.
Results
The Main Result
Proposition 3.1 There exists aδ, with 0 <δ ≤ 1, such that, for any value function w and any δ such that 0 ≤ δ <δ ≤ 1 there exists an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure y f , P such that for any g ∈ G and any link ij in g N the probability of transition P (g * (ij)|g) is increasing in the difference of payoffs x i,g * ij (y f , P ) − x i,g (y f , P ), whenever positive.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We need the following definitions. Let z be an allocation rule. Let (P • z) (i, g) = g P (g |g) z i,g be the expected payoff player i gets next period if the current graph is g and payoffs are given by z.
Note that the operator P transforms an allocation rule z into another allocation rule P • z, and that W P transforms an allocation rule z into a value function W P • z. Given that (W P • z) is a value function, we can compute its Myerson value. Let (m • W P ) • z be the Myerson value applied to W P • z.
It is easily seen that (W P • z) is linear in z. Furthermore, the Myerson value m is linear in the value function. Therefore (m • W P ) • z is linear in z. Note that (m • W P ) is an operator which transforms an allocation rule z into another allocation rule (m • W P ) • z.
Let I be the identity operator. Given that P and (m • W P ) transform allocation rules into allocation rules, so do (I − δP ) and (I − δ (m • W P )) −1 , when the latter exists.
I will denote m(w) the Myerson value applied to the value function w to avoid confusion with the Myerson value of the value function W P • z. The following lemma solves the problem of efficiently and fairly allocating the value taken the dynamics as given, as a preliminary step for the result stated in Proposition 3.1.
Lemma 3.2 Let the transition probability matrix P ∈ Π be given. Then, (1) the operator (I − δ (m • W P )) has an inverse for almost every δ and (2) for all these δ there exists a unique component efficient allocation rule y f and such that the pair (y f , P ) is expected fair, and it is given by y f (w) = (I − δP )
Proof of Lemma 3.2. I proceed to prove (1) first. Let A be the matrix associated with the linear operator (m • W P ). Then, (I − δ (m • W P )) has an inverse if and only if the determinant of I − δA, denoted |I − δA| is different from zero. We have that |I − δA| = 0 if and only if 1 δ is an eigenvalue of A. Therefore, the operator (I − δ (m • W P )) has an inverse for every δ except for a (possibly empty) finite set of points. This completes the proof of (1).
(2) Assume that δ is such that the operator (I − δ (m • W P )) has an inverse. Let x * be the allocation rule given by
I prove the following three steps. First, that the allocation rule y f in Lemma 3.2 generates x * as the expected payoff vector, i.e., x * = x y f , P . Second, I prove that an allocation rule y is component efficient (with respect to w) and the pair (y f , P ) is expected fair if and only if the induced discounted expected payoff vector x y f , P is the Myerson value of an auxiliary value function W x . Finally, I show that x * is the unique solution to x = m (W x ) , where m (W x ) is the Myerson value applied to the value function W x .
Claim 1. Given a transition probability matrix P , the allocation rule
is the unique allocation rule generating x * as the expected payoff vector.
Proof of Claim 1. By definition, P δ,∞ = (I − δP ) −1 = I + δP P δ,∞ . Recall that the matrix (I − δP ) is full rank. Therefore, for any allocation rule y and its induced discounted expected vector x (y, P ) we have
it follows that y f and P generate x * as discounted expected payoff vector. In order to see that it is unique once we fix the transition probability matrix P , note that
can be rewritten as
for all players i, where y(i) = (y i,g ) g∈G and x(i) = (x i,g ) g∈G . As the matrix I − δP is full rank, it follows that the operator (I − δP ) is bijective. This completes the proof of Claim 1.
For any given allocation rule x, we can define the following value function:
for all g and for all T ∈ N |g. Let m (W x , g) be the Myerson value for W x at graph g.
Claim 2. Given any transition probability matrix P ∈ Π, the allocation rule y is component efficient for the value function w and the pair (y, P ) is expected fair if and only if x (y, P ) = m W x(y,P ) .
Proof of Claim 2. I show first that if y is component efficient for the value function w and, if for a given P ∈ Π the pair (y, P ) is expected fair, then
for all graphs g and all players i. If y f is component efficient with respect to w, then
for all T ∈ N |g. In other words, if y is component efficient with respect to w, then x(y, P ) is component efficient with respect to W x . Furthermore, if (y, P ) is expected fair, then x(y, P ) is fair. But, by Proposition 2.1 there is only one allocation rule that is component efficient with respect to W x and fair, namely m (W x ). Now I prove that if m (W x ) = x then the pair (y, P ) that obtains x = x(y, P ) is expected fair with y being component efficient. If m (W x ) = x for all graphs g, then, for all graphs g and all T ∈ N |g, i∈T
and i∈T
Therefore, the allocation rule y in the pair (y, P ) that obtains x is component efficient. On the other hand, the pair (y, P ) that obtains x is also expected fair, for x is fair. This completes the proof of Claim 2.
Claim 3. There is a unique allocation rule x such that x = m (W x ), namely
Proof of Claim 3. By definition of W x above and by linearity of the Myerson value, m (
As we have seen before, (m • W P ) is linear in x. Thus, if there is an x such that x = m (W x ), then it has to satisfy the linear equation
Note that if δ is such that (I − δ (m • W P )) has an inverse, the solution to such equation is unique, namely
This completes the proof of Claim 3.
By Claims 2 and 3, the allocation rule y such that the pair (y, P ), for a given P ∈ Π, obtains
• m as discounted expected payoff vector is the unique allocation rule which is component efficient and such that the pair (y, P ) is expected fair. By Claim 1, the unique allocation rule such that together with the given P ∈ Π obtains x * is y f . Therefore, y f is the unique allocation rule which is component efficient and such that together with the given P ∈ Π is expected fair. This completes the proof of (2) and therefore it completes the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Once the problem of allocation is solved for a fixed transition probability matrix, I proceed to prove existence when the transition probability matrix depends on the total discounted, expected stream of payoffs. This is done by first constructing a continuous function from a compact and convex set onto itself, with the property that each fixed point of the function induces an expected fair and pairwise network formation procedure y f , P , with y f being component efficient. From Lemma 3.2 we know that for a given transition probability matrix P and discount factor δ such that the operator (I − δ (m • W P )) has an inverse, there exists a unique allocation rule y f which is component efficient and such that (y f , P ) is expected fair, given by
Lemma 3.3 There exists a 0 <δ ≤ 1 such that, for 0 ≤ δ <δ, the operator
exists for all P .
Proof of Lemma 3.3. I need the following definitions. As mentioned before, an allocation rule induces a payoff vector in n×|G| . I choose the following convention when constructing the matrices corresponding to each of the relevant operators. For a given y ∈ n×|G| , let y(i) ∈ G be the payoff vector only for player i, i.e., y(i) specifies the payoff player i gets in each possible graph in G. Then I can write
which means that the payoff vector y specifies first the payoff a player gets in each possible graph, and then turns to the payoffs corresponding to next player. Taking this convention, the matrix corresponding to the linear operator m • W P can be written as the product of two square matrices of dimension n × |G|, i.e.,
where P I n is the Kronecker product of the matrix P with the identity matrix of dimension n. Thus, the matrix P I n is a (square) block diagonal matrix of dimension n × |G|, being each block equal to P . Note that P I n is the matrix corresponding to the operator P , which transforms a payoff vector y into another payoff vector P • y = (P I n ) · y as follows
On the other hand, the matrix M is also a square matrix of dimension n×|G| that transforms a payoff vector x into the payoff M · x. This new vector M · x is fair and satisfies
for all g and all T ∈ N |g. In other words, M · x is the payoff vector resulting from applying the Myerson value to the value functionw (T, g) = i∈T x i,g , for all g ∈ G and all T ∈ N |g. From all the above, M · (P I n ) · y is the result of applying the Myerson value tõ
and therefore M · (P I n ) is the matrix associated with the operator m • W P .
From Lemma 3.2 we know that the inverse of the operator (
where |λ i (M · (P I n ))| is the modulus 16 of the eigenvalue λ i (M · (P I n )). Definē
16 Note that since the matrix M · (P In) is not symmetric, its eigenvalues could be complex.
Note thatρ ≥ 1, because 1 is always an eigenvalue of M · (P I n ). In order to see this, take the payoff vector x ∈ n×|G| such that x i,g = 1 for all i ∈ N and all g ∈ G. It is easily seen that x(i) = P x(i), for all i ∈ N , because the rows of P add up to 1, and that x is fair, because x i,g − x j,g = 0 for any pair of players and any graph g. Hence, M · (P I n ) · x = x, meaning that x is an eigenvector of M · (P I n ) associated with the eigenvalue of 1. This implies, in particular, that ρ((M · (P I n ))) ≥ 1 for any P ∈ Π.
Given that any real eigenvalue of a square matrix cannot be bigger than its spectral radius, we know that if For the rest of the proof of Proposition 3.1, we assume that δ < 1 ρ . Let x (P ) be the discounted, expected payoff vector for the players if the transition probability matrix is equal to P and the allocation rule at each stage is y f as defined in the statement of Lemma 1. In other words,
Recall that L = g N ∪ ∅. Let d be a function which transforms a transition probability matrix P into a vector of differences d (P ) ∈ G×L in the following way
where i is a player in l, if l = ∅, and i is a player in N , otherwise. Note that d(P ) (g, l) does not depend upon the choice of i because the pair (y f , P ) is expected fair and, hence, x(P ) is fair. Fix any β ∈ (0, 1) and consider the following function h assigning to each probability transition matrix P ∈ Π a vector of probabilities h(P ) ∈ G×L as follows
The number h(P ) denotes the probability that link l is eliminated or created in graph g. Note that these probabilities are well defined, namely that h (P ) (g, l) ∈ [0,
Finally, let F : Π → Π be a function which assigns to each transition probability matrix P ∈ Π a transition probability matrix P = F (P ) as follows
It is easy to see that F : Π → Π is a continuous function in Π, because h is a continuous vectorial function on d(P )(g, l), and so is d(P )(g, l) as a function of P . Note that when we approach the vector of zeros from any sequence of nonnegative vector of differences d(P ) k (g, l) , F will always tend to the identity matrix. Because Π is a compact and convex set in |G|×|G| and F : Π → Π is a continuous function in Π, we have, by Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, that there exists at least one fixed point, denoted P * . Let us denote by y f (P * ) the allocation rule y f fixing P * as the transition probability matrix. If P * is a fixed point in F , i. e., P * = F (P * ), then, y f (P * ), P * is an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure. It is so, first, by the definition of y f (P * ) as the unique component efficient allocation rule that is expected fair together with P * , and, second, by construction of the function F . Note that h yields a higher transition probability when the corresponding difference d(P )(g, l) is higher because the function
is increasing in z when β < 1. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Special cases
Clustering bias
Proposition 3.1 states that there is a threshold value of δ below which an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure is guaranteed to exist for any value function w. This restriction comes mainly from the existence of an expected fair and component efficient allocation rule y f once P is considered fixed. By imposing further conditions on the transition probability matrix P we can guarantee the existence of an expected fair, (restricted) pairwise network formation procedure for any value function w and for any δ < 1. In particular, we can impose that the creation of new links can only take place if the participants already belong to the same connected component in the current network. I will call this restriction clustering bias. Definition 3.4 Let the pair (y, P ) be expected fair. Then, (y, P ) is called a pairwise network formation procedure with clustering bias if for any given g and g ∈ G such that g = g * ij:
1. if i and j do not belong to the same component S ∈ N |g, or, when they do, if
Note that when players i and j are directly connected in g they must belong to the same connected component. Therefore, a pairwise network formation procedure with clustering bias allows the deletion of any link present in the network and the creation of links among agents already indirectly connected. When we restrict the transition probability matrix in such a way we can prove that for any δ ≤ 1 there always exists an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure with clustering bias for any w. This is formally stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.5 For any value function w and for any 0 ≤ δ < 1 there always exists an expected fair, pairwise network procedure with clustering bias (y f , P C ) such that, given a graph g and any link ij in g N the transition probability P (g * ij|g) is increasing in the difference of payoffs x i,g * ij (y f , P C ) − x i,g (y f , P C ), whenever positive.
The proof of this proposition is identical to the proof of Proposition 3.1, except for two details. First, once the transition probability P is restricted to have clustering bias, we can prove that there always exists a component efficient allocation rule y f that is expected fair together with P , and it is given by the expression in Lemma 3.2. Formally, new Lemma 3.2 should be stated as follows.
Lemma 3.2. Let the transition probability matrix P be given and satisfy clustering bias. Then, there exists a unique component efficient allocation rule y f such that the pair (y f , P ) is expected fair, and it is given by
for the operator (I − δ (m • W P )) has an inverse for every δ < 1.
We provide the proof of the following Claim in Appendix A.
Claim C1. The operator (I − δ (m • W P )) has an inverse for every 0 ≤ δ < 1, assuming P has clustering bias.
The second modification that we need to introduce in the proof of Proposition 3.1 affects the definition of the function d(P )(g, l), being the new definition as follows.
if l = ∅ and its participants do not belong to the same component T in N |g x i,g * l (P ) − x i,g (P ), otherwise where i is a player in l, if l = ∅, and i is a player in N , otherwise. The definitions of h(P ) and F would roll over from this new definition of d(P )(g, l).
Back to the Myerson value
It is easy to see that if δ = 0, then any expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure (y f , P ) will yield the Myerson value as the stage-wise allocation rule, and P can be computed from the differences in payoffs obtained in the Myerson value by the participating players in each of the possible transitions. The question we are exploring here is the conditions under which y f will still yield the Myerson value as the stage-wise allocation rule, when δ is any number in between 0 and 1. We will do so in two steps. First, we identify the property in the transition probability matrix that will make any expected fair allocation rule to be fair too, and second, we identify the structure of value functions that could yield such a property in any pairwise network formation procedure where the Myerson value has been fixed to be the stage-wise allocation rule. Lemma 3.6 Let (y f , P ) be an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure such that the transition probability matrix P satisfies the following two conditions. For any network g and any link ij ∈ g N , 1. P (g|g) + P (g * ij|g) = P (g|g * ij) + P (g * ij|g * ij), and 2. For any l ∈ g N \ij, P (g * l|g) = P ((g * ij) * l|g * ij).
Then, given any δ > 0, the stage-wise allocation rule y f stated in Lemma 3.2 is equal to the Myerson value.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. I will show that, if P satisfies the conditions in Lemma 3.6, then the allocation rule P • y, where (P • y) i,g = g P (g |g) y i,g , is fair for any allocation rule y fair.
Afterwards, I will show that in such a case, any allocation rule is expected fair if and only if it is fair. Since there is a unique allocation rule which is component efficient and fair, the result of Lemma 3.6 follows.
Recall that, by definition of the operator P ,
Because P is part of an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure, it can only assign positive probability to transitions that imply the change of at most one link at a time. This fact, together with P satisfying the conditions of Lemma 3.6, indicates that, for every graph g and every link ij ∈ g,
given that y i,g * l − y j,g * l − y i,(g\ij) * l + y j,(g\ij) * l = 0 for any l ∈ g N \ij, and that y i,g − y j,g − y i,(g\ij) + y j,(g\ij) = 0, because y is fair. Next claim shows that, if P satisfies the conditions in the statement of Lemma 3.6, then any allocation rule is expected fair together with P if and only if it is fair. Claim 4. Let P satisfy the conditions in the statement of Lemma 3.6. Then, any allocation rule y is expected fair together with P if and only if it is fair.
Proof of Claim 4. I show first that expected fairness implies fairness if P satisfies the conditions in the statement of Lemma 3.6, and for any δ > 0. Let y be an allocation rule which is expected fair. This means that the expected discounted payoffs generated by y, denoted x (y, P ), is a fair allocation rule. From the definition of x (y, P ),
and
Because y is expected fair, then x(y, P ) has to be fair, by definition. This implies, first, that
and, second, because P satisfies the conditions in the statement of Lemma 3.6 and x(y, P ) is fair, then we know that P • x(y, P ) is also fair, (P • x(y, P )) i,g − (P • x(y, P )) i,g\ij = (P • x(y, P )) j,g − (P • x(y, P )) j,g\ij , which together imply that
or, in other words, that y is fair.
The other direction, assume y is fair. We know that P • y is also fair because P satisfies the conditions in the statement of Lemma 3.6. Using the same argument recursively, we know that P • P • y = P 2 • y is also fair because P • y is fair, and so on and so forth. Then,
have that y is expected fair. This completes the proof of Claim 4.
Then, by Claim 3.6.1 we know that an allocation rule y is component efficient and, together with P , is expected if and only if it is component efficient and fair, when P satisfies the conditions in the statement of Lemma 3.6. This means that an allocation rule y is component efficient and, together with P , is expected if and only if if and only if it is the Myerson value for w, when P satisfies the conditions in the statement of Lemma 3.6. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.6.
Once we have fixed the allocation rule in the expected fair pair (y f , P ) to be equal to the Myerson value, we need to identify which type of value functions could originate a pairwise network formation procedure (y f , P ) where P satisfies the conditions in the statement of Lemma 3.6. This is done in the following definition and proposition. 
w(S, g) = ij∈g:i∈S and j∈S
Proposition 3.8 Let the value function w be additive separable. Then, for any δ ∈ [0, 1) there exists an expected fair, pairwise network formation (y f , P ) such that, given a graph g and any two link ij in g N the transition probability P (g * ij|g) is increasing in the difference of payoffs x i,g * ij (y f , P C ) − x i,g (y f , P C ) whenever positive, and in addition,
• y f = m(w), i.e., the stage-wise allocation rule y f is equal to the Myerson value, and
• The long run dynamics induced by P converge to the efficient network with probability 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.8. Because the value function w is additive separable, we know that m i,g − m i,g\ij = w(ij), where w(ij), for each ij are the numbers satisfying that w(S, g) = ij∈g:i∈S and j∈S
for any g and any S ∈ N |g. Define, for each link ij, p(ij) =
w(ij)
l∈g N |w(l)| . Note that p(ij) will have the same sign as w(ij). Consider the following transition probabilities for any g and any
Intuitively, if w(ij) is positive and the link ij is not present in the current network g, the probability that i and j will create their link is given by p(ij), positive. If the link ij is present in the current network g, the probability that is deleted is zero. The opposite is true when w(i, j) is negative. The probability P (g|g) is defined as the remaining probability, i.e., P (g|g) = 1 − l∈g N P (g * |l|g). It is easy to check that such a transition probability matrix satisfies the conditions in the statement of Lemma 3.6, and hence, any fair stage-wise allocation rule will be expected fair and the contrary. The transition probabilities only depend on the value of w(i, j) and on whether ij belongs to g or not. Hence, if (m, P ) is an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure with probabilities increasing in the corresponding differences, then x i,g − x i,g * ij should only depend on w(ij) and on whether ij belongs to g or not, being constant in each of the two possible cases. First note that m i,g − m i,g\ij = w(ij) and that, after some computation,
it can only be that x(m, P ) i,g − x(m, P ) i,g\ij = w(ij) 1 1−δ|p(ij|) , for any g such that ij ∈ g, and, equivalently, x(m, P ) i,g − x(m, P ) i,g∪ij = −w(ij) 1 1−δ|p(ij|) , for any g such that ij / ∈ g. All this indicates that if ij ∈ g and w(ij) > 0, then P (g\ij|g) has to be equal to zero (as it is the case in the definition), and if ij / ∈ g and w(ij) < 0, then P (g ∪ ij|g) has to be equal to zero (as again it is the case in the definition). Furthermore, the greater x i,g * ij − x i,g , the greater P (g * ij|g), and viceversa, by means of their relationship with w(ij).
It remains to see that dynamics resulting from the transition probability matrix P above converge to an efficient network with probability equal to 1. Note that the efficient networks are the ones such that all links present in the network have a non negative value, and all links absent from the network have non positive value. Note that all links ij with a positive value w(ij) are always created when not present in the current network, and are never deleted once present in the network. This indicates that the system will converge to a network g * satisfying that all links ij ∈ g * are such that w(ij) > 0, and all links ij / ∈ g * are such that w(ij) ≤ 0. This is in particular an efficient network, as there could be other efficient networks if there are links with zero value. This completes the statement of Proposition 3.8.
The two-player case
For very small number of agents we can prove that there always exists an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure for any w and for any δ < 1, without the need of imposing further restrictions on the transition probability matrix P . This is stated formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.9 Let n = 2. Then, for any value function w and for any 0 ≤ δ < 1 there always exists an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure y f , P . Furthermore, the allocation rule y f in such an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure is always equal to the Myerson value of w, and the long run dynamics induced by P converge to the efficient network with probability 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.9. For n = 2, there are only two possible graphs, which we can denote g 1 = {∅} and g 2 = {12}, where g 2 = g 1 * 12 and g 1 = g 2 * 12. If we fix P ({∅} | {∅}) = p and P ({12} | {12}) = q, we can write the transition probability matrix P I 2 as in Table 1 . 
Note that if the transition probability matrix P is part of an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure (y, P ) for some allocation rule y, then p < 1 would mean that players 1 and 2 strictly gain, in discounted, expected terms, from creating their link. This in turn indicates that q = 1, as q < 1 would mean that players 1 and 2 strictly gain, in discounted, expected terms, from not creating their link. Let us therefore first consider the case where p < 1 and q = 1. The case of p = 1 and q < 1 is equivalent and left to the reader. The case of p = q = 1 is trivial, as the transition probability matrix will be the identity matrix. The matrix M , as defined in the proof of Proposition 3.1 is shown in Table 2 below. Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1) and q = 1. Table 3 , Table 4 and Table 5 below show the matrices corresponding to the linear operators (
Recall that m denotes the Myerson value and hence, by abusing notation, m i,g denotes the payoff allocated to player i in graph g by the Myerson value. Then, (y f , P ) is an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure if two conditions are met. First, y f is obtained by multiplying the matrix in Table 5 by the payoff vector resulting from the Myerson value, Table 3 : Table 4 :
respecting order given by player and graph. Namely, Because the Myerson value is fair, we have that m 1,{∅} − m 1,{12} − m 2,{∅} + m 2,{12} = 0, which indicates that y f can only be equal to the payoff resulting from the Myerson value. It is important to stress that the allocation rule yields the same payoff as the Myerson value for the two player case due to the fairness axiom of the Myerson value, but that the matrix corresponding to the operator (I − δP )
−1 is not equal to the identity matrix.
The second condition that needs to be met deals with the values of p and q that we have assumed from the beginning. Because the discounted, expected payoff derived from each player obtaining the Myerson value is given by
and we have assumed that p > 0 and q = 1, we need, first of all, that m i,{∅} < m i,{12} for both i. This is because x i,{∅} − x i,{12} = The condition m i,{∅} < m i,{(1,2)} thus indicates that w({1, 2} , {(1, 2)}) has to be greater than the sum w({1} , {∅}) + w({2} , {∅}). This means that the link is efficient, as compared to the empty network, and the long run dynamics induced by P converge to the forming of the link with probability one.
If w({1, 2} , {(1, 2)}) is smaller than the sum w({1} , {∅}) + w({2} , {∅}), then the transition probability matrix in an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure (y f , P ) has a structure like in Table 1 above, where p = 0 and q > 0. After equivalent computations and conditions as just above, y f equals the payoff resulting from the Myerson value. Finally, if w({1, 2} , {(1, 2)}) is equal to the sum w({1} , {∅}) + w({2} , {∅}), then the transition probability matrix in an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure (y f , P ) yields p = 0 and q = 0, therefore the identity matrix, and y f equals once more to the payoff resulting from the Myerson value. Note that all these results hold for any δ in (0, 1). This completes the proof of Proposition 3.9.
Comparison with Myopic and Farsighted Pairwise Stability
The notion of a pairwise network formation procedure is inspired by previous notions of pairwise stability that have been defined and analyzed in the literature of strategic network formation. A comparison is therefore in order. I would like to stress that all those previous notions assume a predetermined static allocation rule, and focus on the problem of network formation, contrary to what I do here. I start by introducing the notion of pairwise stability, as defined by Jackson and Wollinsy (1996) . Jackson and Watts (2002) study a dynamic network formation process based on this notion of pairwise stability. Pairs of players are called to play with a given probability and, once called to play, they can decide to form or sever their link relatively to the current network. For example, if two players currently not directly connected, namely i and j, gain from forming their link relative to the current network g, then the network g ∪ ij will be present next period with the probability that the pair ij is called to play. This deterministic approach induces long term dynamics always converging to a pairwise stable network or a closed cycle of networks. 17 The authors afterwards perturbe the initial game by allowing mistakes to happen with a small probability. As the probability of making mistakes goes to zero, the perturbed process will refine the set of stochastically stable networks found in the unperturbed or initial game. 2005) propose the concept of a Markovian equilibrium, defined as no bilateral gain from creating (own) links and no unilateral gain from deleting own links links. Gains or deviations are computed according to the whole stream of payoffs (expected and discounted) generated in the process, and it is therefore forward looking or farsighted. The authors identify the conditions under which the dynamic process will yield efficient outcomes, namely when the allocation rule is componentwise egalitarian and the value function is link monotonic for the graphs that have positive value. Herings et al. (2006) define the concept of farsightedly pairwise stable set as a minimal (with respect to inclusion) group of networks satisfying the following two properties. First, all possible farsighted pairwise deviations from any network inside the set to a network outside the set are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off (internal stability). And second, there exists a farsightedly improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set (external stability). A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players (bilaterally) form or (unilaterally) delete links based on the improvement the end network offers relative to the current network. The authors prove that the farsightedly pairwise stable set is a singleton containing a Pareto dominant network, when the latter exists. Finally, Page et al. (2005) define farsightedly consistent networks to be a collection of directed networks, each one such that no deviating coalition, by transforming the current network, cannot make all of its members strictly better off. Gains for members of the coalition take into account the transformations that could eventually be taken by other coalitions and it is therefore a forward looking notion. The authors prove that such a solution concept always exists, for any payoff structure and any rules governing the transformation of the network into another by the members of a given coalition. In that sense, pairwise stability is one possible rule governing the transformation of the current network into another, but their results hold for any other rule of transformation too.
Due to the simplicity of the two player case in the previous section we can easily prove that the expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure exists for all δ but results into the Myerson value as an allocation rule together with a transition probability matrix that yields the same prediction as pairwise stability, as defined by Jackson and Wollinsky (1996) , when the Myerson value is predetermined as the exogenously given allocation rule. For greater number of players, it is worth stating specifically the notion of pairwise stability that lies behind our notion of expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure. I will call it expected pairwise stable because it is not equivalent to farsighted pairwise stability as defined by Herrings et al. 
Definition 4.2
Given an allocation rule y and a transition probability matrix P , a graph g ∈ G is called expected pairwise stable with respect to y and P if 1. For any link (i, j) ∈ g:
x i,g (y, P ) − x i,g\(i,j) (y, P ) ≥ 0, and x j,g (y, P ) − x j,g\(i,j) (y, P ) ≥ 0.
For any link
Note that this definition of expected pairwise stability can be considered also a forward looking extension of the concept of pairwise stability defined by Jackson & Wolinsky (1996) and, as the latter, it assumes that links are created by unanimity of the two players involved in such a link, but they can be dissolved unilaterally. Definition 4.3 Given a transition probability matrix P , a graph g is called an absorbing state of P if P (g|g) = 1. Proposition 4.4 Let y f , P be an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure such that y f is component efficient. Then, a graph g is an absorbing state of P if and only if it is expected pairwise stable with respect to y f and P .
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Note that if g is an expected pairwise stable graph, x i,g y f , P − x i,g y f , P ≤ 0 for all g such that g = g * l and i ∈ l with l = ∅. If (y f , P ) is a pairwise network formation procedure, then P (g |g) = 0 for all g such that g = g * l with l = ∅. Given that P is a transition probability matrix it has to be that P (g|g) = 1.
The other sense of direction, let (y f , P ) be an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure and assume there exists a graph g ∈ G such that (1) P (g|g) = 1 and (2) g is not expected pairwise stable with respect to (y f , P ). Given that g is not expected pairwise stable with respect to y f and P there exists another graph g = g * (i, j) with x i,g y f , P −x i,g, y f , P > 0. Recall that this automatically indicates that x j,g y f , P − x j,g y f , P > 0 because (y f , P ) is expected fair. By definition of a pairwise network formation procedure, it has to be then that P (g |g) > 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, if there exists a graph g ∈ G such that P (g|g) = 1, then g is expected pairwise stable with respect to (y f , P ). This completes the proof of Proposition 4.4.
As in Jackson and Watts (2002) setting, the dynamics induced by an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure may converge either to one or several expected pairwise stable networks and/or to one or several closed cycle of networks. Nevertheless, if δ > 0 the networks that are expected pairwise stable from a pair (y f , P ) do not in general coincide with the pairwise networks when fixing the Myerson value as a stage-wise allocation rule, and they could coincide with the efficient ones. The next example builds on an value function for which the unique pairwise stable network when using the Myerson value a stage-wise allocation rule is not efficient. Nevertheless, we can find two different expected fair, pairwise network formation procedures. In the first one, the dynamics in P converge to the unique pairwise stable network with probability one, even though the (stage-wise) allocation rule does not coincide with the Myerson value. In the second one, the dynamics in P converge to one of the efficient networks with probability one, when δ is high enough, and this, with the stage-wise payoffs tending to the same payoffs as the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule when δ approaches 1. Finally, I provide a four-player example to show that the dynamic system induced by an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure converges to a closed cycle of networks containing the efficient network with probability one.
A three-player example
Let us consider three players, 1, 2, and 3. There are eight possible network structures: The value function w is given by The efficient networks are the ones with two links each, yielding a value of 13/4, but if the Myerson value is fixed as the exogenously given rule, the only pairwise stable network is the complete one. . I will present now a family of expected fair, pairwise network formation procedures (y f , P ), which values depend on the value of δ, yielding the same long term dynamic behavior as pairwise stability with the Myerson value as an exogenously given allocation rule. To make the exposition clearer, I will first introduce P and then the payoff recommendation from the allocation rule y f . Let us consider a transition probability matrix as the one below, where the order of rows respects the order in Figure 1 top left to top right first and bottom left to bottom right afterwards. In other words, first row and column of the transition probability matrix corresponds to the complete network, second row and column corresponds to the network where players 1 and 2 are both directly connected to 3, and so on and so forth. Last row and column corresponds then to the empty network. Figure 2 in Appendix B visualizes these dynamics, each arrow indicating a transition from one network to another, including itself. The letters at each arrow indicate the probability with which the corresponding transition takes place, according to the transition probability matrix (8) above. We see that players tend to create links at any moment in time and no link is broken, so that the long term dynamics result in the complete graph being the final network independently of the initial one.
4.
The allocation rule y f gives the same recommendation as the Myerson value for all networks except the two-link networks, namely g 2 = {(1, 3), (2, 3)}, g 3 = {(1, 2), (2, 3)} and g 4 = {(1, 2), (1, 3)}. For those three networks, the player with two links, namely player 3 in g 2 , player 2 in g 3 and player 1 in g 4 , receives y . Note that y f recommends the same payoff as the Myerson value if p = q for any δ, or if δ = 0 for any value of p and q, but it gives in general a different recommendation. Table 6 shows the expected, discounted payoffs x(y f , P ) obtained from y f explained above, and P given by transition probability matrix in (8). Table 6 : The expected discounted payoffs x(y f , P ) obtained from matrix in (8) Let us define the differences A, B and C as follows.
It is easy to see that A < B for any δ ∈ (0, 1). If we want (y f , P ) to be a pairwise network formation procedure with transition probabilities being increasing in the corresponding differ-ences it has to be then that p < q ≤ 
, expressions that satisfy 0 < A < C < B for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
Expected fair, pairwise network procedure leads to efficient networks
Let p ∈ 0, . As before, I will present a family of expected fair, pairwise network formation procedures (y f , P ), which values depend on the value of δ. These procedures though yield a different long term dynamic behavior as before, so that the players tend in the long run to connect as in one of the three efficient networks. The transition probability matrix presented below follows the same order of rows as in (8) . 
We can again visualize these dynamics, this time by means of Figure 3 in Appendix B. Each arrow in Figure 3 indicates a transition from one network to another, including itself. The letters at each arrow indicate the probability with which the corresponding transition takes place, according to the transition probability matrix (9) above.
As before, the allocation rule y f gives the same recommendation as the Myerson value for all networks except the two-link networks, namely g 2 = {(1, 3), (2, 3)}, g 3 = {(1, 2), (2, 3)} and g 4 = {(1, 2), (1, 3)}. For those three networks, the player with two links, namely player 3 in g 2 , player 2 in g 3 and player 1 in g 4 , receives y . Note that y f recommends the same payoff as the Myerson value if q = 0 for any δ, or if δ = 0 for any value of p and q, but again it gives in general a different recommendation. Table 7 shows the expected, discounted payoffs x(y f , P ) obtained from y f explained just above, and P given by transition probability matrix in (9). Table 7 : The expected discounted payoffs x(y f , P ) obtained from matrix in (9) 
We can similarly define the differences A, B and C as follows. 18
The reader can check that p = 12(7−3δ)(7−5δ) , and C = (21 − δ)(7 − 5δ) + 14δ 3(7 − 3δ)(7 − 5δ) , expressions that satisfy 0 < A < B < C for any δ > 252 255 , consistent with 0 < p < q < r, if we want (y f , P ) to be a pairwise network formation procedure with transition probabilities being increasing in the corresponding differences. It is not by chance that δ has to be high enough. When δ is close to zero the long run dynamics given by the transition probability matrix can only be consistent with (myopic) pairwise stability after fixing the Myerson value as an exogenously given allocation rule. These would be the dynamics corresponding to the transition probability matrix in (8) , and not to (9) , as it is the case here. Furthermore, as δ tends to one, the payoff recommended by the allocation rule y f tends to the same payoff recommended by the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule or the flexible-network playerbased allocation rule, proposed initially by Jackson (2005) but adapted environments when the structure of externalities among components is known by Navarro (2010).
A four-player example
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. In order to generate the value w, the only thing that matters is whether players 1 and 2 and/or players 3 and 4 are directly connected or not. We can divide the 64 possible networks into 20 different groups of networks. The name of each group contains a number, which is the number of links of any network belonging to such a group, and, whenever that distinction is needed, a letter among A, B, C and D, depending on (i) whether 1 are 2 are directly connected and 3 and 4 not, (ii) whether 1 and 2 are not directly connected and 3 and 4 are, (iii) whether both couples are not directed connected or, finally, (iv) whether both couples are directly connected, respectively. Table 8 states all possible groups, where some subgroups have been also separated.
There are two subgroups, namely G3A and G3B. In these subgroups the number of components in N may vary for different graphs in the group. The group G3A1 is the group of graphs such that (a) the number of links in the graph is 3, (b) the link 12 is present while 34 is absent, and (c) there are two components in the population. The group G3A2 is different from G3A1 only in part (c): there is only one component in the population in G3A2. Groups G3B1 and G3B2 are similarly separated. Figure 4 in Appendix B presents the value function. I have taken a representative graph from each group (and subgroup) and the value of each component in the network is written next to the component. Player 1 is represented by the node placed on top left, player 2 on bottom left, player 3 on top right, and player 4 bottom right.
As mentioned before, the value function is symmetric with respect to players 1 and 2 on one side, and with respect to 3 and 4 on the other side. Note also that in groups G0, G1B, G2D and G1A players 3 and 4, when directly connected, generate more value together if players 1 and 2 are not directly connected, while players 1 and 2, when directly connected, generate more 
value together if 3 and 4 are directly connected as well. There are thus some externalities (one negative and one positive) between the block formed by players 1 and 2, and the block formed by players 3 and 4 inside the groups G0, G1B, G2D and G1A. For any other group, it is always worse to create links. This could be interpreted as a congestion (negative) externality starting from the efficient graph (the one with maximum value), which is G2D = {(1, 2), (3, 4)}.
Assume for simplicity that δ = 1 2 . I will introduce an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure such that the Markov chain converges to a closed cycle of networks with probability equal to 1. Figure 5 in Appendix B represents the transition probability matrix P , while Table 9 represents the (stage-wise) allocation rule and the expected, discounted payoffs associated to it. The transition probabilities are increasing in the corresponding differences only once we fix the current network. For example, the corresponding differences if the current network is the complete one, G6, are equal to 360, for the transition from G6 to G5A (see expected payoffs for players 3 and 4), and 120, for both the transition from G6 to G5B (see expected payoffs for players 1 and 2) and from G6 to G5D (see expected payoffs for players 1 and 3). Accordingly, each of the possible transitions from G6 to G5D and the one from G6 to G5B have all same probability of occurring, namely 1/10, and the transition from G6 to G5A has a greater probability of occurring, namely 1/2. When we consider transitions from network G5D, the differences are equal to 360, from G5D to G4A (see expected payoffs for players 3 and 4), and 120, both from G5D to G4B (see expected payoffs for players 1 and 2) and from each of the three possible from G5D to G4D (see expected payoffs for players 1 and 3). The former transition occurs with probability 1/2, which is greater than each of the other possible transitions, occurring each with probability 1/8, but a difference of 120 starting from any current network does not yield automatically a transition of 1/10.
Note that in Figure 5 we have written transition probabilities between groups, not between networks. The way to read such probabilities is as follows. Let us take, for example, the transition probability between G5D and G4D. In Figure 5 above this transition probability reads 3 × 1 8 . This means that (1) from each graph in G5D there is a transition to three different graphs in G4D, and (2) the transition probability to each of these different graphs is equal to 1 8 . Thus, the total transition probability from one group to another is 3 8 . Given the transition probability matrix in Figure 5 , the associated allocation rule conforming an expected fair, pairwise network formation procedure yields the stage payoffs y i and the following corresponding discounted, expected payoffs x i for players i = 1, 2, 3, 4 stated in Table  9 . Table 9 : Stage-wise payoffs and expected, discounted total payoffs from the EFP network formation procedure The long run dynamics induced by y and P converge to the closed cycle (G0, G1B, G2D, G1A). The probability for all the transitions in this closed cycle are 1, and all the groups in this cycle contain only one network.
Final Remarks
This paper explores ways of distributing the value of a network among forward looking individuals when these same forward looking individuals strategically develop the network through time. The dynamics of the network formation process are represented by means of a stationary transition probability matrix. At any moment in time players receive payoffs according to a stage-wise allocation rule that depends on the current network and not on the moment in time, and players discount the future by some common discount factor. Because the dynamics in the network formation process are induced by self-interest individuals that are creating or severing links at a time, the transition probability matrix should be somehow consistent with the allocation rule at hand. At the same , the allocation rule should depend on the network formation process, if agents are forward-looking.
I have proposed three properties on the allocation rule and on the transition probability matrix and answer the question of existence. First, the allocation rule together with the transition probability matrix is expected fair, meaning that for each link the network both participants gain or lose the same amount, in terms of the whole stream of discounted, expected payoffs, from breaking their link at time zero. Second, the allocation rule is component balance. And third, the transition probability matrix is consistent with some pairwise network formation procedure, namely the probability that a direct connection is created (or eliminated) is positive if so are the total discounted, expected gains for the two players involved in the creation (or elimination) of such a connection. This probability should be zero when the corresponding total discounted, expected gains are negative. I can prove that for any number of agents a system formed by an allocation rule and a transition probability matrix with the former three properties exists if the discount factor is small enough, and, what is more, the transition probabilities are increasing in the difference in payoffs to the players responsible for such a transition. In order to enlarge the result of existence to all discount factors, I need to impose further conditions on the transition probability matrix P , as the problem of existence is inherited from the problem of allocation the value in an expected fair way.
Even though the property of expected fairness is a forward-looking extension of the concept of fairness, introduced by Myerson (1977) in a static setting where the surplus from cooperation is given by a TU game, I do not obtain in general the Myerson value as a stage-wise allocation rule. I have shown that, if the value function is additive-separable, a very restrictive condition, then it is true that expected fairness will imply stage-wise fairness, and viceversa, and the dynamics induced by the transition probability matrix converge to an efficient network. What is more insightful, if we restrict ourselves to clustering processes, then the existence result holds for any discount factor. The problem thus in terms of allocating the value of the network in an expected fair way (given the transition probability matrix) comes from the new connections that can be formed.
Appendix A Claim C1. The operator (I − δ (m • W P )) has an inverse for every 0 ≤ δ < 1, assuming P has clustering bias.
Proof of Claim C1. From Lemma 3.2 we know that the inverse of the operator (I − δ (m • W P )) exists if 
If the transition probability P has clustering bias, the creation of new links can only occur between two players already indirectly connected. This means that for any g and g such that P (g |g) > 0 any coalition S that is disconnected from N \S in g will still be disconnected from N \S in g . Then I can rewrite the conditions defined by (10) in matrix form as follows. For any coalition S ⊆ N , define the vector x(S) ∈ |G| , where each coordinate x(S) g is given by
x(S) g = i∈S x i,g , if S and N \S are disconnected in g 0, otherwise.
It is easily seen that conditions (10) for any g and any S ∈ N |g are equivalent to the system of equations λx S = P x S , for any S ⊆ N , where P is the transition probability matrix with clustering bias. 19 Note that the system defined by (11) , for any S ⊆ N indicates that if there is one S ⊆ N such that x(S) g = 0 for at least one g then λ, the eigenvalue of the operator m • W P , has to be an eigenvalue of the transition probability matrix P . But we know that there is at least one S ⊆ N such that x(S) g = 0 for at least one g. By contradiction, if x(S) g = 0 for any S ⊆ N and any g then x can only be the zero vector, because, as mentioned before, x has to be fair and the Myerson value for a value function that yields zero everywhere is equal to the zero vector. This is a contradiction with x being an eigenvector of the operator m • W P , as any eigenvector has to be different from zero. Hence, it has to be that there exists at least one S such that there exists at least one g with S ∈ N |g and i∈S x i,g = 0, and λ then has to be an eigenvalue of the transition probability matrix P . Accordingly, it cannot be greater than 1. This completes the proof of Claim C1. 
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